fixed in mga8/9


src:
    - netty-4.1.51-1.2.mga8

Assignee: java => qa-bugs
Version: Cauldron => 8
CC: (none) => mageia
Status comment: Fixed upstream in 4.1.61 => (none)

netty-4.1.51-1.2.mga8
netty-javadoc-4.1.51-1.2.mga8

from netty-4.1.51-1.2.mga8.src.rpm

Whiteboard: MGA8TOO => (none)

MGA8-64 Plasma on Lenovo B50
No installation issues.
Ref bug 28446 Comment 4, OK on clean install

Whiteboard: (none) => MGA8-64-OK
CC: (none) => herman.viaene

type: security
subject: Updated netty packages fix security vulnerabilities
CVE:
 - CVE-2021-21295
 - CVE-2021-21409
src:
  8:
   core:
     - netty-4.1.51-1.2.mga8
description: |
  In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.60.Final there is a
  vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a Content-Length header is
  present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by
  `Http2MultiplexHandler` as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as the
  request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes in as an
  HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects (`HttpRequest`,
  `HttpContent`, etc.) via `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec `and then sent up
  to the child channel's pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1
  this may result in request smuggling. In a proxy case, users may assume the
  content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If the request is
  forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection, the Content-
  Length now has meaning and needs to be checked. An attacker can smuggle
  requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. For
  an example attack refer to the linked GitHub Advisory. Users are only affected
  if all of this is true: `HTTP2MultiplexCodec` or `Http2FrameCodec` is used,
  `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec` is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 objects,
  and these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer. This has been
  patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user can do the validation by
  themselves by implementing a custom `ChannelInboundHandler` that is put in the
  `ChannelPipeline` behind `Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec`
  (CVE-2021-21295).
  
  In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.61.Final there is a
  vulnerability that enables request smuggling. The content-length header is not
  correctly validated if the request only uses a single Http2HeaderFrame with
  the endStream set to to true. This could lead to request smuggling if the
  request is proxied to a remote peer and translated to HTTP/1.1. This is a
  followup of GHSA-wm47-8v5p-wjpj/CVE-2021-21295 which did miss to fix this one
  case. This was fixed as part of 4.1.61.Final
  (CVE-2021-21409).
references:
 - https://bugs.mageia.org/show_bug.cgi?id=28985
 - https://www.debian.org/security/2021/dsa-4885

CC: (none) => ouaurelien, sysadmin-bugs
CVE: (none) => CVE-2021-21295, CVE-2021-21409
Keywords: (none) => advisory, validated_update
Source RPM: netty-4.1.51-2.mga9.src.rpm => netty-4.1.51-1.1.mga8.src.rpm

An update for this issue has been pushed to the Mageia Updates repository.

https://advisories.mageia.org/MGASA-2021-0374.html

Resolution: (none) => FIXED
Status: NEW => RESOLVED