OpenSSL has issued an advisory on December 8: https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20201208.txt The issue is fixed upstream in 1.1.1i and in this commit: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/f960d81215ebf3f65e03d4d5d857fb9b666d6920 1.0.2 is in Bug 27305. Mageia 7 is also affected.
Whiteboard: (none) => MGA7TOO
Debian and Ubuntu have issued an advisory for this on December 8: https://www.debian.org/security/2020/dsa-4807 https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-4662-1
Assignee: bugsquad => nicolas.salgueroCC: (none) => nicolas.salguero
Hi, openssl 1.1.0 suffers from the same problem as compat-openssl10: with current crypto-policies package, the policy has to be set to LEGACY to be able to pass the "check" section when building the package so I disabled the "check" section. Best regards, Nico.
Suggested advisory: ======================== The updated packages fix a security vulnerability: The X.509 GeneralName type is a generic type for representing different types of names. One of those name types is known as EDIPartyName. OpenSSL provides a function GENERAL_NAME_cmp which compares different instances of a GENERAL_NAME to see if they are equal or not. This function behaves incorrectly when both GENERAL_NAMEs contain an EDIPARTYNAME. A NULL pointer dereference and a crash may occur leading to a possible denial of service attack. OpenSSL itself uses the GENERAL_NAME_cmp function for two purposes: 1) Comparing CRL distribution point names between an available CRL and a CRL distribution point embedded in an X509 certificate 2) When verifying that a timestamp response token signer matches the timestamp authority name (exposed via the API functions TS_RESP_verify_response and TS_RESP_verify_token) If an attacker can control both items being compared then that attacker could trigger a crash. For example if the attacker can trick a client or server into checking a malicious certificate against a malicious CRL then this may occur. Note that some applications automatically download CRLs based on a URL embedded in a certificate. This checking happens prior to the signatures on the certificate and CRL being verified. OpenSSL's s_server, s_client and verify tools have support for the "-crl_download" option which implements automatic CRL downloading and this attack has been demonstrated to work against those tools. Note that an unrelated bug means that affected versions of OpenSSL cannot parse or construct correct encodings of EDIPARTYNAME. However it is possible to construct a malformed EDIPARTYNAME that OpenSSL's parser will accept and hence trigger this attack. (CVE-2020-1971) References: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-1971 https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20201208.txt https://www.debian.org/security/2020/dsa-4807 https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-4662-1 ======================== Updated packages in core/updates_testing: ======================== openssl-1.1.0l-1.2.mga7 lib(64)openssl1.1-1.1.0l-1.2.mga7 lib(64)openssl-devel-1.1.0l-1.2.mga7 lib(64)openssl-static-devel-1.1.0l-1.2.mga7 openssl-perl-1.1.0l-1.2.mga7 from SRPM: openssl-1.1.0l-1.2.mga7.src.rpm
Assignee: nicolas.salguero => qa-bugsVersion: Cauldron => 7Status: NEW => ASSIGNEDWhiteboard: MGA7TOO => (none)CVE: (none) => CVE-2020-1971
Installed and tested without issues. After three days of workstation usage with this update installed, no issues or regressions were noticed. System: Mageia 7, x86_64, Plasma DE, LXQt DE, Intel CPU, nVidia GPU using nvidia-current proprietary driver. $ uname -a Linux marte 5.7.19-desktop-3.mga7 #1 SMP Sun Oct 18 15:46:00 UTC 2020 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux $ rpm -qa | grep openssl.*1.1.0 | sort lib64openssl1.1-1.1.0l-1.2.mga7 libopenssl1.1-1.1.0l-1.2.mga7 openssl-1.1.0l-1.2.mga7
CC: (none) => mageia
$ uname -a Linux localhost 5.7.19-desktop-3.mga7 #1 SMP Sun Oct 18 15:46:00 UTC 2020 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux ec 20 16:30:22 localhost [RPM][7743]: erase lib64openssl-devel-1.1.0l-1.1.mga7.x86_64: success Dec 20 16:30:22 localhost [RPM][7743]: erase openssl-1.1.0l-1.1.mga7.x86_64: success Dec 20 16:30:22 localhost [RPM][7743]: erase lib64openssl1.1-1.1.0l-1.1.mga7.x86_64: success Dec 20 16:30:23 localhost [RPM][7743]: install lib64openssl1.1-1.1.0l-1.2.mga7.x86_64: success Dec 20 16:30:23 localhost [RPM][7743]: install lib64openssl-devel-1.1.0l-1.2.mga7.x86_64: success Dec 20 16:30:24 localhost [RPM][7743]: install openssl-1.1.0l-1.2.mga7.x86_64: success Dec 20 16:30:24 localhost [RPM][7743]: erase lib64openssl-devel-1.1.0l-1.1.mga7.x86_64: success Dec 20 16:30:24 localhost [RPM][7743]: erase openssl-1.1.0l-1.1.mga7.x86_64: success Dec 20 16:30:24 localhost [RPM][7743]: erase lib64openssl1.1-1.1.0l-1.1.mga7.x86_64: success Dec 20 16:30:24 localhost [RPM][7743]: install lib64openssl1.1-1.1.0l-1.2.mga7.x86_64: success Dec 20 16:30:24 localhost [RPM][7743]: install lib64openssl-devel-1.1.0l-1.2.mga7.x86_64: success Dec 20 16:30:24 localhost [RPM][7743]: install openssl-1.1.0l-1.2.mga7.x86_64: success I ran a number of hashing tests they all seemed to work. I then ran this command and confirmed it is working fine: $ openssl s_client -connect www.mageia.org:443 harvested sufficient information to convince me it is working.
CC: (none) => brtians1
This update has been installed on this workstation for over a week without issues. Giving it the OK for x86_64 to see if this moves forward since it is a security update.
Whiteboard: (none) => MGA7-64-OK
Validating. Advisory in Comment 3.
Keywords: (none) => validated_updateCC: (none) => andrewsfarm, sysadmin-bugs
Advisory pushed to SVN.
CC: (none) => ouaurelienKeywords: (none) => advisory
An update for this issue has been pushed to the Mageia Updates repository. https://advisories.mageia.org/MGASA-2020-0467.html
Status: ASSIGNED => RESOLVEDResolution: (none) => FIXED