GNU has released gnupg 1.4.14 and libgcrypt 1.5.3 (used by gnupg2) to fix an attack vector that allows users on a shared machine to steal other users' private GPG keys. The updates were announced on July 25. The update announcement for gnupg provides a good description of the issue:
A CVE has been requested, with no response yet:
Steps to Reproduce:
CVE-2013-4242 has been assigned:
Working on update.
Fixed in Cauldron in gnupg-1.4.14-1.mga4 and libgcrypt-1.5.3-1.mga4.
Currently built for Mageia 3:
Debian has issued advisories for this on July 29:
Is there any procedure to test the updated package?
(In reply to Olivier Delaune from comment #6)
> Is there any procedure to test the updated package?
I don't know that there's any documentation on how exactly to perform the RSA side-channel attack, so I don't know that you'll be able to verify that the CVE is fixed.
What will need to be tested is that the gnupg stuff basically works. You can look at the gpg and gpg2 manpages for some of the options and information on different things that they do. You can use those commands to encrypt and decrypt a file for example.
gnupg-1.4.12-1.2.mga2 + libgcrypt-1.5.0-2.1.mga2 has been submitted.
Found no PoCs, basic usage tested only. All OK.
Thanks Nicolas and Oden. Assigning to QA.
Updated gnupg and libgcrypt packages fix security vulnerability:
Yarom and Falkner discovered that RSA secret keys in applications
using GnuPG 1.x, and using the libgcrypt library, could be leaked via a
side channel attack, where a malicious local user could obtain private
key information from another user on the system (CVE-2013-4242).
Updated packages in core/updates_testing:
Testing complete Mageia 2 and 3, i586 and x86_64.
On each install, generated a key (using kgpg set to use /usr/bin/gpg, instead
of /usr/bin/gpg2), encrypted and signed a msg with "gpg -sea msg", decrypted it
with "gpg msg.asc".
Could someone from the sysadmin team push 10850.adv to updates.