Bug 28640

OpenSSL has issued an advisory for this today (March 25):
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20210325.txt

Assigning this to NicolasS who has committed openssl several times in the recent past.

Assignee: bugsquad => nicolas.salguero

Suggested advisory:
========================

The updated packages fix security vulnerabilities:

An OpenSSL TLS server may crash if sent a maliciously crafted renegotiation ClientHello message from a client. If a TLSv1.2 renegotiation ClientHello omits the signature_algorithms extension (where it was present in the initial ClientHello), but includes a signature_algorithms_cert extension then a NULL pointer dereference will result, leading to a crash and a denial of service attack. A server is only vulnerable if it has TLSv1.2 and renegotiation enabled (which is the default configuration). OpenSSL TLS clients are not impacted by this issue. (CVE-2021-3449)

The X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT flag enables additional security checks of the certificates present in a certificate chain. It is not set by default. Starting from OpenSSL version 1.1.1h a check to disallow certificates in the chain that have explicitly encoded elliptic curve parameters was added as an additional strict check. An error in the implementation of this check meant that the result of a previous check to confirm that certificates in the chain are valid CA certificates was overwritten. This effectively bypasses the check that non-CA certificates must not be able to issue other certificates. If a "purpose" has been configured then there is a subsequent opportunity for checks that the certificate is a valid CA. All of the named "purpose" values implemented in libcrypto perform this check. Therefore, where a purpose is set the certificate chain will still be rejected even when the strict flag has been used. A purpose is set by default in libssl client and server certificate verification routines, but it can be overridden or removed by an application. In order to be affected, an application must explicitly set the X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT verification flag and either not set a purpose for the certificate verification or, in the case of TLS client or server applications, override the default purpose. (CVE-2021-3450)

References:
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-3449
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-3450
https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20210325.txt
========================

Updated packages in core/updates_testing:
========================
openssl-perl-1.1.1k-1.mga8
openssl-1.1.1k-1.mga8
lib(64)openssl1.1-1.1.1k-1.mga8
lib(64)openssl-devel-1.1.1k-1.mga8
lib(64)openssl-static-devel-1.1.1k-1.mga8

from SRPM:
openssl-1.1.1k-1.mga8.src.rpm

Status: NEW => ASSIGNED
Whiteboard: MGA8TOO => (none)
CVE: (none) => CVE-2021-3449, CVE-2021-3450
Status comment: Fixed upstream in 1.1.1k => (none)
Assignee: nicolas.salguero => qa-bugs
Version: Cauldron => 8

Mageia 7 and 8, x86_64 Plasma.

No issue so far since day 1.

Critical one.
Validating.

CC: (none) => ouaurelien

RedHat has issued an advisory for this on March 29:
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2021:1024

(In reply to Aurelien Oudelet from comment #4)
> Mageia 7 and 8, x86_64 Plasma.
> 
> No issue so far since day 1.
> 
> Critical one.
> Validating.

You didn't add the validated keyword, or put an OK in the whiteboard.

Taking care of that...

CC: (none) => andrewsfarm, sysadmin-bugs
Keywords: (none) => validated_update
Whiteboard: (none) => MGA8-64-OK

An update for this issue has been pushed to the Mageia Updates repository.

https://advisories.mageia.org/MGASA-2021-0176.html

Resolution: (none) => FIXED
Status: ASSIGNED => RESOLVED