| Summary: | CVE-2017-5753 and CVE-2017-5715 still not addressed | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Product: | Mageia | Reporter: | Herbert Poetzl <herbert> |
| Component: | Security | Assignee: | Kernel and Drivers maintainers <kernel> |
| Status: | RESOLVED FIXED | QA Contact: | Sec team <security> |
| Severity: | critical | ||
| Priority: | Normal | CC: | ghibomgx, herbert, marja11, tmb |
| Version: | Cauldron | ||
| Target Milestone: | --- | ||
| Hardware: | All | ||
| OS: | Linux | ||
| Whiteboard: | MGA6TOO | ||
| Source RPM: | kernel-4.14.13-1.mga6.src.rpm | CVE: | |
| Status comment: | Addressed in current kernel update candidate | ||
| Bug Depends on: | 22533 | ||
| Bug Blocks: | |||
|
Description
Herbert Poetzl
2018-01-14 08:55:47 CET
We know. It's still being worked on upstream... CC:
(none) =>
tmb
Marja Van Waes
2018-01-15 08:53:27 CET
Whiteboard:
(none) =>
MGA6TOO, MGA5TOO
David Walser
2018-01-15 21:34:36 CET
Whiteboard:
MGA6TOO, MGA5TOO =>
MGA6TOO
David Walser
2018-02-02 18:35:52 CET
Depends on:
(none) =>
22454 We are getting there... With a retpoline-aware gcc (5.5.0-1 in mga6, 7.3.0-1 in cauldron) and 4.14.17-2 kernel: CVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1' * Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (kernel confirms that the mitigation is active) * Kernel has array_index_mask_nospec: YES (1 occurence(s) found of 64 bits array_index_mask_nospec()) > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization) CVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2' * Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (kernel confirms that the mitigation is active) * Mitigation 1 * Kernel is compiled with IBRS/IBPB support: NO * Currently enabled features * IBRS enabled for Kernel space: NO * IBRS enabled for User space: NO * IBPB enabled: NO * Mitigation 2 * Kernel compiled with retpoline option: YES * Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler: YES (kernel reports full retpoline compilation) * Retpoline enabled: NO > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (Mitigation: Full generic retpoline) CVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3' * Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (kernel confirms that the mitigation is active) * Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): YES * PTI enabled and active: YES * Running as a Xen PV DomU: NO > STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (Mitigation: PTI) Depends on:
22454 =>
22533 I get: Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): NO with 4.14.18-1.mga6 on 32bit i586 kernel. Is that CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION is not supported on i586 arch or just missed? CC:
(none) =>
ghibomgx There is no PTI on 32bit yet... there are some patches posted as RFC, but they still had some issues... Interestingly Joerg Roedel just posted his new set for review on LKML.. It has grown from ~10 patches to 31 for now... :) And I've now merged and pushed the pti for 32bit to cauldron as of kernel-4.14.18-2.mga7 currently building fixed as of: http://advisories.mageia.org/MGASA-2018-0134.html Status:
NEW =>
RESOLVED |